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ABSTRACT
The retention of well trained and qualified junior officers in the
United States Navy has long been a serious problem that is becoming
more acute every day. This study compares certain relevant factors
of both the navy and industry that affect retention of officers and junior
executives alike* It analyzes the problems confronting young men about
to select a career in either the navy or industry, with the hope that it
can make sound recommendations on how to increase the retention rate
in the navy. The appendix contains ann analysis of an entirely new and
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Down through the history of the American Republic, the supremacy of
civilian government over the military has been eepeatedly stated. The
Constitution itself provides safeguards and thus reflects the founding
father's fears of military takeover in government. That the military shall
be subordinate to the civilian executive is a tenant as jealously guarded
as the Bill of Rights. Argument for sublimation of military professionalism
during peacetime and ascendency during periods of national emergency
follows easily. Traditionally, the Armed Forces were held at the very
minimal strengths in peace and swelled with full mobilization for war
when all constituencies had considerable human resources invested. The
result was an alternating national opinion regarding the social status as-
cribed to the man in uniform - high when the percent of populace human
resource investment was high, and conversely. Ostensibly, the reasoning
behind such undulation is the presence or absence of patriotic purpose en-
nobled during periods of national threat.
Today the advancement of science and technology has altered the
mechanism of the military mission. The nature of the threat to national
security will no longer allow time for full mobilization and upgrading of
military skills - this in spite of the country's superior resources. The

advent of nuclear capability has made waging war relatively cheap. It
is acknowledged that future threats must be met by our forces in being .
It is therefore mandatory to henceforth maintain our Armed Forces at levels
of sufficient professional resource to counter every threat, whether in the
nature of "brush fire" wars or nuclear holocaust. This fact, the reality we
face, is most germane to the 4s sue of this paper.
Despite the severity of the "Cold War", we are in the trough of
popular opinion regarding the military professional career. There will
never again be sufficient time to alter public opinion regarding the accor-
dance of status to the military professional. Undulating upward swings
of opinion which ascribe status to the uniform are over and done with.
Gross national investment of human resources in national defense is no
longer likely under any circumstances.
Ever since the problem of retaining skilled individuals in uniform
reared up, the history of effort expended to counter it is fairly analogous
to a small boy with a pen knife "whittling" down a large redwood tree.
All sorts of inducements have been rendered which appeared promising,
such as offers of more or advanced training, choice of duty assignment,
increased emphasis on individual and group morale, mandatory reenlistment
interviews, habitability designs for berthing quarters, selective proficiency
pky for critical specialities, leadership schools have sprung up, and the
Services resorted to much advertising. A majority of these inducements

were couched in words which either stated outright or broadly hinted that
acceptance also would equip one better for civilian life. In effect, much
of the effort was contradictory. Emphasis was inappropriately placed.
The Services were running "themselves" down - actually ascribing lesser
status to the service as a full, honorable, and rewarding career, while
enhancing the prospects of life as a civilian. Further, it is now "near-
doctrine" in the Service that this is a "first career". That "doctrine" in
essence, flatly denies the feasibility of a full career in the service of one's
country, no matter the individual's qualifications.
What level of military skill is required to meet any reasonable threat
to our national security? Before any material action can be taken to counter
the retention problem this question must be answered - and the response
significantly affects the solution.
The First Alternative: If it is concluded that in spite of the existing
problem we are achieving overall sufficient levels of military skills, at
a cost we can bear, then we must conclude that there is no retention pro-
blem at all. In effect, we are then accepting the trade-off of higher mili-
tary level of skill for other benefits. We are maximizing "bang for the
buck" at a level we can live with. Messrs. Hitch and McKean in their
book "Defense in the Nuclear Age" draw attention to the national benefits
of military training by terming them "government investment in human re-
sources" as a contributing means of maintaining a continuing acceptable

rate of rise in the GNP. As an example, they cite the training of pilots
who later fly for commercial airlines, and the benefits of the G.I. Bill
as they apply to the nation's total output. This view ignores the individual
serviceman and the sacrifices he must make. But in the strict economic
sense, that conclusion is dependent on the correct response to the quest-
ion of whether or not our military skill level is adequate to meet the nation-
al threat in an age of accelerating science and technology. Minor induce-
ments, barely effective, coupled with carefully timed minor incremental
salary increases, even insufficient to keep up with the cost of living, can
be geared to maintain the skill level "decided upon". The retention pro-
blem can thus be dismissed as a threat to our national security.
The Second Alternative; If it is concluded that the retention problem
is_ inhibiting our ability to counter the threat to the national security suc-
cessfully, then we shall endeavor to thoroughly research the problem and
to make firm and logical recommendations to alleviate it.
It is already fact that one of the most important management problems
facing the United States Navy today is the loss of qualified junior officers
from the active duty forces , Therefore for the purposes of this paper we
have selected the second alternative for this research study.
In this day of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems and the
advanced state of technology there are greater and greater demands for a
naval officer who is competent in both the technical and managerial func-
tions. In order to maintain an officer corps at the desired level, both
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quantitatively and qualitatively, it is imperative that the number of junior
officers remaining on active duty beyond their obligated service be increased.
The low retention rate has several undesirable aspects which mold
into a problem of major proportions. First, there is the simple requirement
of manning the fleet with sufficient numbers of experienced officers to
maintain the state of operational readiness required to meet national
exigencies. Secondly, it is monetarily an expensive process to train
officer candidates formally, then provide the necessary experience, only
to lose their services to the civilian community. Thirdly, it is a compound-
ing problem which stretches into the future and effects the navy of tomorrow
to an even greater extent. The degree of selectivity for promotion to ranks
of greater responsibility is reduced to a point where it cannot help but take
its toil on the caliber of leadership in the future.
There is currently a shortage of experienced officers aboard surface
ships. To alleviate the shortage, billets are being filled by officers of
lower rank than desired. The number of officers promoted from the- enlisted
ranks without the benefit of a higher education has been increased. There
are several disadvantages inherent to this policy. The lower ranking of-
ficer may lack the knowledge and experience necessary for the job. On
the other hand, the officer brought up from the enlisted ranks generally has
the technical knowledge, but he may be found lacking in the managerial
aspects.

The Navy is certainly not the only organization faced with the problem
of losing trained personnel. It is a problem which confronts every organiza-
tion and particularly those with a high replacement cost due to an extensive
training program. The magnitude of the problem from the pure aspect of
numbers is greater in the navy than in any particular corporation in private
industry, but the same principles apply. Industry can analyze the cost
effectiveness aspect more readily as it operates in a competitive environ-
ment and the profit motive is ever present. In spite of these differences,
the need to retain qualified personnel faces every organization if it is to
operate efficiently, and perhaps there are some lessons to be learned by
examining other organizations. The Navy is forced to compete for effective
manpower from the labor market and must utilize every means possible to
be an able competitor.
PURPOSE
It is the purpose of this paper to present a comparative analysis be-
tween retention of junior officers and retention of junior executives within
the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Organization. Pacific Telephone was
chosen for comparison because the organizational parameters more nearly
approximate those of the Navy than do most other corporations. Pacific
Telephone is a large company and a subsidiary of the huge Bell System.
Managerial talent is almost exclusively recruited from college campuses
and progresses up the chain of command. Promotion is almost entirely from
1,1
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within the organization with little or no transfer from other industries.
For these reasons it is believed that an analogy is much more meaningful
than if taken from a cross-section of industry. It is specifically desired
to determine the differences in retention figures, analyze the probable
reasons for differences, and hopefully gain some insight into methods
of improving retention.
There have been many studies conducted in the last few years in an
effort to find methods for improving retention of naval personnel on active
duty. The Secretary of the Navy has recently appointed a Retention Task
Force for the purpose of studying both the enlisted and officer retention
problems. Many of the statistics for this study were taken from computa-
tions gathered by the Secretary of the Navy's Retention Task Force. We
have not found any studies which made a comparison with a specific cor-
poration from private industry. Therefore, it is hoped that this study can
uncover some areas which have not been examined in the past.
Statistics for this study have been derived mostly from primary source
material. Statistics from within the Bureau of Naval Personnel and previous
unpublished studies were used for information germane to the navy retention
problem. Statistics on the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company were
gathered by personal interview with executives within the personnel depart-
ment, and from material published by Pacific Telephone.

SUMMARY CHAPTER I
The United States Navy loses a large percentage of its junior officers
during the first few years of service at a high monetary expense and a
resultant loss of quality in the more senior ranks. Retention of qualified
personnel is a problem which every organization must face, and the purpose
of this study is to present a comparative analysis of retention in the Navy
and that of one of the leading corporations from private industry. Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph was chosen for this study because of its negligible
transfer of higher ranking management personnel from other corporations.
It is hoped that some insight can be gained into reasons for whatever
difference in retention figures exists, realizing that there are certain con-
straints facing both the Navy and Pacific Telephone and Telegraph which




This paper is constructed around the hypothesis that Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Corporation is better able to retain its junior executives than
the Navy is its junior officers. It is assumed that there are policies or
methods involved affecting retention which are applicable to all organiza-
tions, realizing that each organization faces certain constraints which
the other does not.
LIMITATIONS
The college graduate recruited into the Bell System is a volunteer
in the true sense of the word. He has been interviewed by many organiza-
tions and decided on the company he would like to be associated with,
and presumably for a long period of time. On the other hand, while the
officer candidate is a volunteer, there are frequently outside influences
biasing his decision. The prospect of being drafted into the services
certainly influences many to seek the greater opportunities available to
an officer, while at the same time completing their obligated service.
There are also those who have taken advantage of a subsidized college
education and then must fulfill their obligated service, but have no in-
terit ion of remaining in the Navy. In view of these differences it is obvious




The junior executive in industry enjoys a mobility which the junior
officer does not, in that he is free to leave the organization at any time,
whereas the junior officer is obligated for approximately four years after
commissioning. The obligated service undoubtedly has an influence on the
decision to remain on active duty in a favorable way for the Navy. If the
proper time frames are utilized, the factor of obligated service should not
effect the validity of this study.
There are many different sources from which naval officers are com-
missioned, some of which are college source programs and others are not.
Pacific Telephone, on the other hand, recruits its management personnel
from the college graduate population only. This variable must be considered
in making comparison between the two organizations.
The size of the samples varies considerably between the two organ-
izations. The Navy commissions on the order of 10, 000 officers in a given
year, while Pacific Telephone hires 120 into its management force annually.
This figure can be expanded to include the whole Bell System which hires
approximately 1, 500 per year. The Navy figures can be broken down into
certain subpopulations which will make a comparison more realistic.
The Navy and other governmental organizations are restricted to a
greater extent than private industry in the options available to reward an
individual. Pay scales are established by Congress as is the minimum
time in grade for each ranko Industry is able to offer tangible incentives
10

on an individual basis and thus is able to reward quality personnel. As
stated in Forbes:
On-the-ball businesses do all kinds of things to attract and
keep key people.
In addition to salaries and bonuses and profit-sharing plans
and health-medical help, an office carpet and a key to the
executive John seem to be important hallmarks of arrival
near the upper range of company management
Many of the same rewards are applied in the Navy also, but they are not
on an individual basis.
DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS
Specific terms used in this paper may be subject to various interpre-
tations, therefore, the following definitions are enumerated as they are used
throughout this paper.
Retention - Remaining on active duty or with an organization beyond
a specified period of time In reference to naval officers this will always
refer to a date of expiration of obligated service or later.
llxx Unrestricted Line - Designator for surface officers who are un-
restricted in duty assignments „ They are the officers primarily used in
manning the ships at sea.
13xx Unrestricted Line - Designator for aviation officers who are
unrestricted in duty assignment - these are the officers used primarily
in manning the air arm of the Navy.
NROTC (R) - With the Naval Academy this is the primary source of
USN regular officers. The Navy pays tuition, textbooks, and instructional
ln Good! First-Class Travel Up, " Forbes, XCV (May 1, 1965) 11
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fees and $50 per month retainer pay for 4 years. Must participate in 3
summer cruises and attain a bachelor's degree for commissioning.
NROTC (C) - Source for reserve officers. Navy pays $27 per month
for junior and senior years. Must participate in 1 summer cruise and
attain a bachelor's degree for commissioning.
OCS - Officer Candidate Program. Primary source of surface reserve
officers. Requires a bachelor's degree and 4 months training for commission-
ing a
ROC - Reserve Officer Candidate Program. Attend college as inactive
reserve enlisted man and take active duty training for two summers of 4
weeks duration each.
AOC - Aviation Officer Candidate - Bachelor's degree required. Com-
missioned after 4 months pre-flight training and continue flight training.
Inctm 3-1/2 years obligation on completion of flight training or about
5 years from time of commissioning.
NAVCAD - Naval Aviation Cadet Program. Two years college re-





ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING RETTENTIQN
BACKGROUND
The navy is experiencing shortage in many catagories of officer
designators and rank, but some are much more critical than others.
The Secretary of the Navy Retention Task Force has outlined the fol-
lowing catagories as appearing to have critical shortages: *
a. The surface line in the grade of LT, LCDR, and CDR.
b. The Aviation Line in the grade of LTJG and LT.
c. The Special Duty Officer Law Community in the grade of LCDR.
d. The Medical Corps in the grade of CDR.
Qo The Dental Corps in the grade of LCDR and CDR.
fo The Supply Corps in the grade of LCDR„
g. The Civil Engineering Corps in the grade of LT and LCDR.
The most crucial discrepancies from the standpoint of numbers alone
is in the llxx surface area. The following table illustrates the degree of
these shortages.
U. So Naval Officer Statistical Study, page 111
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llxx llxx Billets filled Actual shortage
Surface available by next lower llxx Plus loss
Line To Grade, Tars Actual to billets of
Rank Billets Fill and LDOs Shortage Higher Rank
CDR 2,1116 1,432 296 684 913
(229)*
LCDR 3,376 2,125 367 1,251 1,734
(483)*
LT 5,532 3,295 3,252 2,237 3,812
(1,575)*
*Figures in parenthesis are officers filling billets of next higher rank.
Reproduced from SecNav Retention Task Force Study.
Table 1 portrays the overall Navy Manning level for Officers versus
Billets.
Because the unrestricted line community has a background that is
more closely aligned with that of Pacific Telephone recruits than do the
other specialties, our study is limited to this category of officer. It
would not be reasonable to compare navy specialists with the line person-
nel of Pacific Telephone or vice versa.
The source of programs for unrestricted line officers are the Naval
Academy, NROTC, ROC, and OCS. Of the total unrestricted line popula-
tion, 84% hold a bachelor degree or higher. The perc©ntegj® lof.Tiew.l^h
dommissidneTl officers is higher than 84% and has been increasing* in decent years.
The junior executives" with "Pacific Telephone that are. being used for compar-
ison all hold a bachelor degree. From these figures it can be seen that the




Available Officer versus Billets (Less TP&P) Expressed in Percentages
ENS LTJG LT LCDR CDR CAPT
11XX Surface 142 150 55 58 60 62
11XX Submarine 3 100 84 117 137 359
13XX Aviation 13 63 63 100 106 141
135X Aviation Ground 138 104 102 65 145 100
14XX EDO Note 1 Note 1 75 88 65 109
15XX WfDO Note 1 Note 1 86 73 72 99
161X SDO (Crypto) Note 1 40 144 98 93 111
162X SDO (Law) Note 1 39 141 55 109 140
153X SDO (Intel) Note 1 Note 1 97 62 102 120
165X SDO (PIO) Note 1 Note,: 1 143 76 51 100
21XX MC Note 2 Note 2 117 92 51 105
22XX DC Note 2 Note 2 115 56 56 131
29XX NC 3G 03 75 229 9G 80
31XX SC 140 160 91 67 89 94
37XX SC LDO Note 1 109 348 47 467 - -
410X ChC Note 2 16 C5 131 179 126
510X CEC Note 1 127 69 64 83 94
jXXX (LDO) 29G on oZoo 267 62 159 - -
Note 1. - Since there are no, or very rew billets written for these grades
and since there are considerable numbers of junior officers in
these designators, percentages are so large as to be meaningless.
Note 2. - No billets and no officers in these ranks.





Statistics on retention were obtained by major imput source for unre-
stricted line officers originally commissioned from fiscal years 1954
through 1961. Figures were obtained beginning with the end of obligated
service and for four years thereafter. Statistics for junior executives are
for those whose initial employment was for the first ten years. Tables
showing these figures are included in this chapter.
A comparison of the various factors generally thought to influence
desirability of employment was made. These inqlude the areas of salary
structure, retirement, fringe benefits, promotion opportunity, permanency
of location
,
level of responsibility and specialization , prestige, job sat-
isfaction, security , and education . Salary scales for the different levels
of management in Pacific Telephone are comparable to those of the Navy.
They are set up on a seven level achievement structure which closely
approximates the seven ranks in the military establishment. A comparison
of starting salaries is listed and figures for other tangible aspects of
employment are available.
Differences between the employment factors for each organization were
studied on the basis of their probable effect on retention. These differ-





Retention figures for unrestricted line officers commissioned in Fiscal
Years 1954 through 1961 are shown in the table below. The figures are
broken down by input source and total for all sources. Percentages are
shown for the year at which obligated service ends and for each of the
subsequent four years. Because of the different obligation incurred with
different source program the years of commission service vary from 3 to
9 years
o
Retention Rates By Source Code (llxx surface)
USNA NROTC(R) NRQTC(G) ROC PCS TOTAL
Obligation 803 63,7 44.8 57.6 32. 1 39.8
Obligation +1 61.8 23o3 15.7 25.4 18.6
Obligation +2 54. 1 13.8 6.0 14,5 12.0
Obligation +3 48.7 8o7 3.6 8.0 8.5
Obligation +4 43.1 6,4 2.3 7. 1 5L7i 8.8
Source: Bureau of Naval Personnel
Retention Rates For Management Personnel
In Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
END OF ONE YEAR 82.0
END OF SECOND YEAR 76. 5
END OF THIRD YEAR 7 0. 5




A complete comparison of salaries cannot be made due to the lack of
information available from Pacific Telephone, However, the following
beginning salaries are shown for comparison:
Ensign Ensign






*540 - 700 241.20
47.88





It is not considered essential to this study that further salary in-
formation be included. There are studies available which compare civil-
ian/military wages by industry average through all ranks =
*This range is dependent on the individuals technical background
and the amount of education. A Master Degree increases the salary $75. 00
per month while a Doctors Degree can increase the base amount by over
$100. 00/month and is usually negotiated to the agreement of both the
individual and Pacific Telephone.
^Simon Arzigian, Civilian/Military Compensation Study , Personnel
Research Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Task Assignment 31.4-1 W,




The use of fringe benefits has become an increasingly larger part of
total compensation throughout the work force in recent years. Long con-
sidered a major advantage of a military career, the relative gap between
industry and the military has been closing in recent years „ No attempt
will be made to assign a monetary value to these benefits, but they will
be listed and discussed for both organizations. The following are sup-
plementary benefits available to naval personnel:
Federal Income Tax Exemptions - Naval personnel receive a subsis-
tence allowance and a quarters allowance (if housing is not provided)
which are exempt from Federal Income Tax„ This is actually an increase
in pay rather than a fringe benefit.
Social Security - Benefits are the same for all participants whether
military or civilian.
,
Dependency and Indemnity Compensation - Compensation payable to
widow or certain other dependents upon death of serviceman. It is in_effect
only while on active duty. Amount payable is equal to $112. 00 per month
plus 12% of base pay.
Death Gratuity - Lump sum payment to survivor equal to six times the
monthly base pay at time of death within an $800. 00 minimum and $3, 000
maximum.




Medical Care - Provided for serviceman and his dependents. On an
availability basis.
Commissaries - Provide groceries at a generally more reasonable
price than available in community.
Post Exchange - Provide many dry goods at a more reasonable price
than available in the community.,
Recreational Facilities - Such facilities as clubs, theaters, and
swimming pools which are available at a reduced price.
Mortgage Insurance Premium - Plan for payment of FHA Insurance for
serviceman purchasing a home with an FHA loan.
Retirement - Eligible to retire between 20 and 30 years active duty
at a monthly retainer equal to 2 1/2% of base pay for every year on active
duty.
The following are fringe benefits applicable to employees of Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph and other companies of the Bell System:
Retirement -Eligible to retire between age 62 and 65. The amount
received is equal to 1% per month of the highest average earnings over
any five year period of employment.
Insurance - Double indemnity policy at a cost of forty-cents per
thousand face value. This is group term insurance with no cash value.
Thirty per cent of the amount will be paid in one sum at death and the
remaining 70 per cent will be paid by 12 monthly installments (plus in-
terest). After retirement at least half of this insurance will be in effect
and will be paid by the company.
20

Social Security - The same law applies as does to the Military.
Medical i .Disability Benefits - Basically a Blue Cross plan that the
company now pays one-fourth of the preimums, and they will presently
defray up to one-half of the cost of the plan. On top of this Pacific
Telephone has an Extraordinary Medical Expense Plan (EME)» This plan
pays 80% of covered medical expenses (50%' for mental care outside a
hospital), and out-of-pocket amount equal to 4% of the employees annual
basic pay with a minimum of $100 and a maximum of $500, plus a maximum
of $20, 000 in benefits ($5, 000 for dependents over 65 and for retired
employees and their dependents) „
Death Benefits - Death as a result of sickness:
Length of service Amount paid employees surviors
6 mos - 2 yrs 4 months wages
2 yrs - 3 yrs 6 months wages
3 yrs - 4 yrs 8 months wages
4 yrs - 5 yrs 10 months wages
5 yrs and over 1 yrs wages
Death as a result of accident (on the job) 3 years wages, but not
to exceed $30, 000. Funeral expenses not to exceed $500. 00 per employee,
Stock Options - Allows each employee to purchase company stock at
eight-five percent of face value at time, of purchase with two years to pay
for the stock at no interest,,
PROMOTION
Opportunity for promotion of naval officers is governed by the Officer
Promotion Act of 1947 as incorporated in Title 10, U. S. Code. This law
21

prescribes minimum in-grade requirements. The following table shows the
minimums established by law and those existing at the present time.
TIME IN GRADE FOR SELECTION
GRADE TITLE 10 Minimum CURRENT -1 yr. Commission Service
at Promotion Pt.
ENS - 1-1/2 1-1/2
LTJG 2 2-1/2 4
LT 4 5-1/2 9-1/2
LCDR 4 5 14-1/2
CDR 5 6-1/2 21
CAPT 3 - -
Source: Bureau of Naval Personnel
Promotion in the Pacific Telephone organization is not constrained by
law and is obviously going to vary over a wide range depending of the in-
dividual. This would appear to be a major attraction to the outstanding
individual because he can advance much more rapidly. Nevertheless,
average figures are useful for comparison and the following table shows
average service to the various management levels.




The Linearity Promotion System . Down through the years officers have
been promoted on a "lineal list". Provision is in the law for "deep selection",
i. e. consideration for promotion of outstanding individuals up to two years
earlier than normal expectation for their particular year ;group. Some few
officers are promoted this way in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.
22

Recently such legislation authorized it for the Coast Guard. In effect,
the law permitting deep zone selection says, "All officers are either
exactly equal in their performance or they are truly outstanding". There
is no scale of performance. There is in the Service, as in industry, or
any other area of human endeavor, a wide scale of achievement among
human beings. The causal ' elements of individual competence are many
and variedo
Deep zone selection itself has defects. It has produced undesirable
"halo" effects, or criterion contamination. Occasionally, more in the way
of performance is expected of these individuals than they are able to
produce* When evaluated the reference group is not "all other officers
of similar age, rank, and experience" but rather a race of imagined
"superior officers". The result is a poorer evaluation than that to which
they would normally be entitled. Another side-effect, particularly notice-
able in the smaller branches, is the generation of "envy" resulting from
use of the deep zone. Lineal list promotion therefore remains the pro-
minent feature determining promotability.
What is the lineal list? When first commissioned, either from a
Service Academy, OCS, direct commissioning, or whatever, an officer is
assigned a lineal number and placed in a "year group" which roughly
coincides with the year in which commissioned. For the most part he will
henceforth be promoted no earlier and no later than one number after the
23

man whose signal (linear) number is one less than his own* This is true
assuming he passes through the promotion boards. When his zone is
under consideration he can only lose numbers for failing to be approved
for promotion, but cannot gain numbers for successfully passing through
for selection for promotion,. In effect, there is possible penalty for poor
performance, but no relative reward for outstanding or above average per-
formance.
Younger officers particularly look ahead at their future careers and
view this system with distaste. Certainly there are some few who lack
confidence in their ability to make it in the long * run. But ideally, every
H
new ensign commissioned should aspire to the top of the ladder. No one
ever attains heights any higher than their aspirations. The linear list is
therefore a source of distress to the intelligent and energetic youngster -
the fellow most under consideration when the problem of retention is dis-
cussed. Given the right set of conditions, there is no reason why the
Service should not compete for some of our best minds.
For years the fitness report has been under fire as a means of measur-
ing officer performance. Argument generally revolves about the fact that
the basis for the report is a "value judgment" exercised by the reporting
senior. Value judgments have no exact scale of measure. Despite most
serious efforts to devise some "absolute" reference, or nearly so, this
defect remains and is likely to be with us always. Some raters tend to
24

mark high and others low. This is the sole justification for the lineal list
promotion system as a compromise "best" alternative. It is acknowledged
on all levels to be unrealistic but no reasonable substitute has been offered
to date» For the most part then the fitness report exists only as a "means
for selecting officers out of the service".
Figures 1 and 2 show the promotion opportunity for Lieutenant Comman-
der to Commander and from Commander to Captain. All other lower ranks
were at or very near 100% promotion opportunity.
LOCATION
One of the inherent characteristics of a naval career is the frequent
change in duty from one location to another. An officer can anticipate
being transferred to a new duty station every two to four years. This mo-
bility is a desired feature to many, but considered a major disadvantage
to most officers. Children are taken in and out of schools and left with
no real feeling of permanency. Choice of homesites is usually limited
for a number of reasons connected with short tours of duty. The rents paid
are usually premium and the moves take quite a bit out of the already limited
savings of the junior officers. Although the extent cannot be determined,
the instability of location certainly causes some officers to leave the
service. The junior executive with Pacific Telephone can normally expect
to remain in the same general location for a long period of time. If a per-
son desired a more itinerant life he probably would not have entered the
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factor in employees leaving Pacific Telephone Company.
Frequently named as one of the primary reasons for leaving theMavy
is the ^undesirable aspect of long periods of time at sea and separation
from families coupled with added expense of maintaining two households
with insufficient renumeration. By the very nature of the mission of the
Navy this aspect cannot be controlled. Certainly it is a factor which will
effect the comparison of retention in an unfavorable manner for the navy.
PRESTIGE
Prestige, status, and public image are intangibles which have long
been recognized as incentives for assuming greater responsibilities and
positive aspects toward attracting employees. It is generally recognized
as a major attraction toward white-collar jobs even though they may be
lower paying. If some officers suffer from unfulfilled "Status needs",
what must it be for the technically trained and competent officers? The
record shows us the answer. They get out in droves at the end of their
obligated service. Those who stay are often the ones the service least
wants.
There is no simple solution to this problem. The men most in demand
by the military are the high achiever, the energetic, the ambitious, those
most seeking not only a sense of professional accomplishment but also
reasonable status in the community. Rewards do play an important role
in American life. All these things cannot be totally separated from "status".
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There is evidence 'throughout industry as well as the Military of
greater privileges extended with additional responsibility in an effort
to increase prestige and status „ The only significant study we have been
able to find concerning the public image of various occupations was,
"Attitudes of Adult Civilians toward the Military Service as a Career"
conducted for the Armed Forces Office of Information and Education in








Minister or Priest 4
Lawyer 5
Public School Teacher 6
Officer in the Armed Service 7
Farm owner or operator 8
Carpenter 9




Owner of small store in City 14
Garage Mechanic 15
Enlisted Man in the Armed Service 16
Barber 17
Sales Clerk in a store 18
Truck Driver 19
The business executive is not specifically listed in this survey but
from the occupational similarities to others listed it appears that he would




The unrestricted line officer group selected for this study is by defini-
tion a non-specialist. An officer may develop a sub-specialty through
various schools and duties as he progresses through his career but he
can anticipate assignments to various departments within an organization
rather then remaining in a particular field. It is in fact desired to give a
junior officer experience in as many different phases of the operation as
feasible. An executive with Pacific Telephone will tend to gravitate into
a specific area within the organization until reaching the upper range of
the management hierarchy. This degree of specialization is a fcasic dif-
ference in the types of organization and may well have an effect on retention.
LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY AND JOB SATISFACTION
Pacific Telephone has recently f incorporated a change in their first
year assignment policies „ Previously, they had assigned a new employee
to different jobs for a short period of time as a trainee while he learned
the ropes „ This policy was changed recently and now a new man is as-
signed directly to a responsible productive position. Since this new "sink
or swim" policy has been incorporated there has been a change in retention
figures. Losses during the first year have increased and then are reduced
drastically to a level below previous figures for subsequent years. It is
felt by the management that there has been a corresponding increase in
quality. The degree of responsibility given a newly commissioned ensign
varies over a wide range depending on the size of the command to which
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he is assigned and other variables, In some organizations he may be
moved from one department to another as a training process while in
others he may be required to remain in one department for a long period of
timeo Retention statistics are not available which relate to type commands,
jobs held, or level of responsibility.
JOB SATISFACTION AND SECURITY
The level of job satisfaction is a difficult factor to determine. Per-
haps it isn't known whether an individual is satisfied with his job until
he leaves the organization and it becomes obvious that he is not. Even
then, we are not sure about the degree of satisfaction of those remaining,
but perhaps they are dissatisfied and remaining for other reasons. There
are those who could never be satisfied working in an authoritarian type
organization regardless of other benefits and the military is by necessity
at one end of the spectrum in the array of authoritarian organizations.
Pacific Telephone is al,so a highly structural organization and certainly
authoritarian in relation to many occupations available in the civilian
community.




TABULAR PRESENTATION OF REASONS FOR RESIGING
CONTAINED IN SECTION OF RESIGNATIONS
Reasons for Resigining 1962 1953 1964
Continue/Further Education
Financial Consideration
Enter Private Practice MC/DC
Deprivation of Home Life
Compelling Family Situation
Enter Specific Field of Endeavor
General Dissatisfaction with Navy Life
Lack of Interest in a Navy Career





No Single Identifiable reason
Base No.
*These miscellaneous reasons include:

















Specialization in a field not available in the Navy
Dissatisfaction with Navy Medical Facilities
General erosion of officer status
Chronic motion sickness
Unsatisfactory Fitness Report
Non-selection for a specific Navy program





The following is a tabulation of the five most frequent reasons




Enter Specific Field of Endeavor
Deprivation of Home Life
Performance
Lack of Interest in a Navy Career
Passed Over for Selection
1962 1 1953 2 19543
39.7% 40 . 3% 33.5%
27 . 5% 29 . 7% 24 . 2%





^Total number of resignations considered - 318
^otal number of resignations considered - 821
-^Total number of resignations considered - 421
Unrestricted Submarine Line




Passed Over for Selection 8.7% No definite 5.1%
Fifth reason
Total number of resignations considered - 23
TCotal number of resignations considered - 54
^Total number of resignations considered - 59
TABLE 3
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Enter Specific Field of Endeavor
Deprivation of Home Life
Continue /Further Education
Compelling Family Situation
Lack of Interest in Naval Career
General Dissatisfaction with Service Life
•'Total number of resignations considered - 110






2.7% 3 . 8%
4.7%
Unrestricted Line Aviation Ground Officers and NAO (1350)
1952-1964
Enter Specific Field of Endeavor 28.9%
Continue /Further Education 22.0%
Deprivation of Home Life 15.2%
Performance 6.8%




There is no way of telling whether or not these are actual reasons,
or perhaps felt to be the most expeditious means of having their resigna-
tion accepted.
Security has traditionally been one of the major selling points for a
military career. Barring extremely unusual circumstances a regular naval
officer is assured of employment for a minimum of 20 years at which time
he is eligible for retirement. If he fails to be selected for promotion to the
rank of LCDR for two consecutive years he is severed from active duty
and paid a lump sum equal to two months pay for every year of commissioned
service. The naval officer also has the security provided his family which
were previously listed under fringe benefits. Pacific Telephone also pro-
vides its management personnel with a high degree of security. Once an
individual has been with the company for four years the chances of his
being involuntarily dismissed are negligible. His job security is not
endangered by fluctuations in the business cycle to the extent many other
occupations are.
EDUCATION
The percentage of college graduates of total commissioned officers on
active duty has increased from 1952-1963 DOD-wide from 46.2% to 69.4%.
In the Navy, the increase during the same years is from 58. 0% to 62.7%.
The Navy's policy has been to attract and to retain large numbers of college
graduates in the officer corps. By various procurement programs the Navy
does gain large numbers of college graduates each year:
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Procurement : Officer Accessions, Classified by Educational Level of
Program (e.g. College Graduate versus non-College
Graduate Programs); Selected Years FY 1954-1964




Input by FY 75.4 74.5 69.3 73.1 77.8 72.2 85.3 86.4 87.3 88.7
NOTE: Accession by education level, by source is not available. However
of the major procurement programs only NAVCAD does not require a
college degree. "Other procurement" sources include a mixture of
college and non-college graduates. Using best available data con-
cerning these sources, the estimated percentage of college graduates
from all sources of officer input is indicated above.
Inadequate retention rates (although improving) of college graduates is
apparent from the high percentage of initial college graduate accessions
versus the relatively low increase in college graduates as a percent of
total commissioned officers in the Navy:
In analyzing retention experience by educational background it becomes
immediately apparent that officers who participate in Navy sponsored post-
gratude education are basically career motivated. Of the approximately
8000 officers who complete postgraduate education from 1947 to 1964 less
than 1% of them terminated their Navy career by resignation. These figures
are exclusive of the Medical Department and Special Duty Officer Community
sponsored postgraduate education. It must be borne in mind that because
of the additional obligated service incurred in pursuing these courses (2
years for each year of education received) an officer who enters the post-
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graduate education system must have an initial high degree of career
motivation.
Considering the high numbers and high percentages of college grad-
uates entering the Navy each year, however, the small annual rise in
college graduates versus total commissioned officers can lead only to
the conclusion that, in the main, college graduates entering the Navy
do not find it an attractive career.
Percent of Naval Officers by Rank holding BA/BS Degrees or Higher
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
J
ENSIGN 88.5 97.2 92.1 90.3 89.8 90.9
LTJG 72.3 73.1 79.1 70.7 73.2 81.1
LT 73.4 69.7 63.6 66.1 62.2 61.4
LCDR 46.7 52.3 55.0 61.9 67.2 68.9
CDR 66.7 64.7 60.6 59.7 62.3 64.4
CAPT 94.8 94.0 89.0 89.6 88.1 87.9
ADM 99.6 100.0 100.0 100/0 100.0 100.0
Educational Background of Total Naval Officer Corps, Year Group 1960-1964
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Less than Hign School 1.1%. 2.2% 1.4% 1.0% .8%
High School Graduates 6.2% 11.0% 10.1% 9.5% 8.9%
Some College 19.0% 18.4% 17.7% 17.7% 16.4%
Bachelor 50.9% 50.6% 50.4% 52.4% 54.9%
Significant P. G. .9% 1.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.2%
Master 6.1% 6.0% 6.0% 6.3% 6.5%
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Doctor 5.9% 7.4% 7.2% 7.2% 7.3%
Not Recorded 9.9% 2.7% 5.3% 3.7% 3.0%
Non-Degree Aggregate 26.3% 31.6% 29.2% 27.3% 26.1%
Degree Aggregate 63.8% 65.7% 60.1% 71.8% 70.9%
Educational Bachqround of Regular Officer Corps, Year Groups 1960-1964
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Less than High School 1.7% 3.5% 3.1% 1.5% 1.3%
High School Graduates 7.8% 11.3% 14.2% 13.7% 13.2%
Some College 21.6% 20.2% 19.6% 19.8% 18.6%
Bachelor 49.7% 46.2% 44.1% 45.0% 46.4%
Significant P. G. .9% 2.5% 2.2% 2.5% 2.8%
Master ' 8.5% 8.1% 7.7% 8.3% 8.8%
Doctor 6.6% 7.4% 6.7% 6.8% 6.9%
Not Recorded 3.2% .8% 2.4% 2.4% 2.0%
Non-Degree Aggregate 31.1% 35.0% 36.9% 35.0% 33.1%
Degree Aggregate 65.7% 64.2% 60.7% 62.6% 64.9%
NOTE: Includes Warrants, Women and Retired Officers on Active Duty.
Pacific Telephone employs only college graduates into their Manage-
ment Achievement Program ranging from the Baccalaureate through the
Doctorate level. They have recently introduced a new educational
assistance progam in which they will give time off with pay to those
employees who wish to further their college education. This time off




The purpose of this chapter was to present a direct comparison of
retention figures for the two organizations, and it was found that Pacific
Telephone retained 64% at a point 10 years after initial employment while
the navy retained approximately only 8. 8% considering all sources. A
further comparison was made of the many variables which are considered
to have an effect on retention. They are: retirement, fringe benefits,
promotion opportunity, permanency of location, level of responsibility,
specialization, prestige, job satisfaction, security, and education.
The next chapter will be devoted to analyzing the effect of these dif-






The United States Navy has been plagued with the problem of retain-
ing junior officers on active duty beyond their expiration of obligated
service. These losses represent not only the monetary loss involved
with training, but also a reduction in readiness caused by the require-
ment to man operating units with inexperienced personnel. Beyond these
immediate consequences and perhaps more serious in the inevitable loss
in quality of senior officers of the future, caused by a resultant reduc-
tion in selectivity for promotion.
Retaining qualified personnel is a necessity in private industry as
well as in the military if they are to operate efficiently. There are cer-
tain options open to each organization which differs from the other, but
the problems are basically the same. It has been the purpose of this
paper to present a comparison between retention of junior executives
within one large corporation and junior officers in the Navy. A comparison
of these factors which affect employment decisions was made in an effort
to analyze differences in retention.
Statistics were gathered from records kept by the Bureau of Naval
Personnel and other studies conducted within the navy. These statistics
were compared with those furnished by Pacific Telephone Company for its
junior executives. It was found that Pacific Telephone retains a much
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larger percentage of its management personnel than does the Navy. The
following pages discuss the various differences in employment variables
previously compared, and the probable effect on retention differences
between the two organizations. .
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Complete salary information was not included in this study but start-
ing points were compared. As would generally be expected the junior
executive starts as a significantly higher salary than does the newly
commissioned ensign, the amount of difference depending on marital
status, education level and technical ability. For the officers involved
in this study the initial employment salary may not be the proper compar-
ison point for purposes of discussing its effect on his decision to remain
in the navy. Under present promotion policies the junior officer makes
Lieutenant after four years commissioned service which also coincides
very closely to the expiration of his obligated service. At this point a
married officer earns approximately $711. 00 per month which compares
more favorably with the salary he can expect starting out in industry.
It is difficult to determine the effect of salaries on the desire for a
particular career. There was not a marked increase in retention of per-
sonnel in the Navy during the year of the previous pay raise although that
in itself does not lead to a conclusion. Psychologists in the field are of
varying opinions concerning the effect of money upon employment. Aaron
Levinstein maintains that there is no substitute for a good wage. " On the




other hand, Frederich Herzberg maintains that a fair wage is important and
essential, but above that, wages do not appear to motivate. 2
Certainly, if wages within the Navy are allowed to lag further behind
the rest of the economy it is going to have an adverse effect on retention
of personnel. The results of a significant increase in military pay are
difficult to predict, but in view of historical evidence a significant in-
crease is not likely to occur. Therefore, while the Navy must continue
to press for an equitable wage for its personnel in order to at least main-
tain the status quo, it is also necessary to look elsewhere for methods of
improving retention.
Fringe benefits available to the naval officer certainly constitute
an important form of remuneration and have historically been thought of ..
as a prime motivator toward a career in the service. The results from the
previous chapter in comparing fringe benefits of the two organizations
show that the Navy has an advantage from this aspect. However, many
of the benefits listed for naval personnel are not available or utilized to
the maximum extent. For example, commissaries, post exchanges, and
recreation facilities are not always available or are so inconvenient and
overcrowded that they are not utilized by many personnel. Mortgage
Insurance Premium was listed, but for many this could hardly be consid-
ered a retention incentive because until recently, personnel were eligible
for a VA loan after discharge which is more attractive than the FHA guaranteed
Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara Block Snyderman,
The Motivation to Work(2nd Ed; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959)




Medical Care is a majpr benefit available to the naval officer which
Pacific Telephone does not offer its employees. While it is not germane
to this study, many industrial organizations have an excellent medical
plan. However, the real issue of interest is the manner in which benefit
of medical care affects officer retention. It would appear that it could
do nothing but improve retention, however, there is perhaps another
aspect which bears on the problem. Frequently, facilities are inadequate
and overcrowded and inconvenient. Medical personnel are frequently
inadequate to provide care for the number of dependents in an area and
an aura of socialized medicine prevails. Medical Care for dependents
along with the other fringe benefits have historically been regarded as
benefits inplicitly guaranteed military personnel. When these benefits
are reduced or inadequate they may have a negative effect on retention
rather than helping to retain officers. When a person has come to expect
something and it is then withheld it will arouse his antagonism, whereas
if nothing was promised or come to be expected it will have a neutral
effect.
Death benefits to dependents for naval officers are far inferior to
those provided Pacific Telephone Company employees. It is difficult
to determine the importance attached to these benefits by different cate-
gories of personnel. It would be reasonable to expect that it has a great
43

impact on the family man, whereas the younger single man as a general
rule has not concerned himself with this contingency as yet. If this
assumption is true, then it would be expected that this benefit would
increase retention rates among family men while having less effect on
single men. Figure 1 shows resignations of naval officers by marital
status. One of the contributing factors to the high rate among married
men is the security factor provided by death benefits.
Retirement benefits available to naval officers has long been consid-
ered a primary incentive for remaining on active duty. While the retire-
ment salary may be comparable with Pacific Telephone, the naval officer
has the unequivocal advantage of retiring at a relatively early age. This
is sometimes looked upon as a disadvantage in that an officer is frequently
forced to retire at a point in his life when his responsibilities are greatest,
but his retainer is insufficient to meet these responsibilities, and con-
sequently he must look, for a new career. However, the retirement system
in the Navy must be considered as a factor which contributes to an in-
creased retention rate.
Frequent transfers from one location to another is a factor which may
appeal to some and be distasteful to others and will therefore affect reten-
tion of naval officers both positively and negatively. Related to transfer
from one duty station to another is a factor peculiar to the Navy which












Resignations by Marital Status by Rank




period of time spent at sea and the additional cost of maintaining the
household while the serviceman is away. There can be no doubt that
this is one of the prime factors contributing to low retention rates within
the navy.
The level of responsibility appears to have a significant impact on
job satisfaction in that it quickly discourages the non-qualified and is
highly satisfying to the more capable individual. This is borne out by
the experience of Pacific Telephone since changing its procedures for
placement of new management personnel. While there are no statistics in
the Navy to validate this analogy, . observation by the authors of this
study has demonstrated a marked increase in motivation and desire to
remain in the Navy on the part of those officers assigned to responsible
positions.
The selectivity process between the two organizations is signifi-
cantly different. Pacific Telephone conducts a comprehensive recruiting
program among the colleges throughout the nation. A prospective employee
must pass the Management Achievement examination, must be in the upper
half of his graduating class academically, and is then interviewed exten-
sively. Of those actually bid for, Pacific Telephone has experienced
approximately a 50% acceptance rate. The Navy, on the other hand has
several different source programs as outlined earlier in this paper. Of
the various source programs, only the Naval Academy approaches the re-
tention rate of Pacific Telephone. Of these source programs only OCS has
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an input primarily drawn from recruiting graduating seniors among the
various colleges. The OCS candidate must successfully meet minimum
physical and mental requirements prior to acceptance. The primary dif-
ference in recruiting of college graduates is the extensive interviews





There is no one "cure-all" that can be adopted to improve the reten-
tion rate of the more qualified junior officers. Rather it must be a judic-
ious improvement of all of the parameters discussed in this research
paper. It must be realized that the Navy is in keen competition with industry
for the most qualified men and industry spends more time and money than
does the military in this recruiting process. Industry can be more selec-
tive of the individuals hired and more flexible in salaries, locations
and positions offered. Therefore it is up to the Navy to make a career
as a naval officer more appealing and more challenging than one in in-
dustry if it is to retain the more highly qualified and trained officers.
The Navy must strive to educate prospective career officers in the
advantages of a naval career. As it now stands many young college
graduates would rather be drafted and serve from six months to two
years in the army than to sign up for four or more years in the Navy.
The most familiar solution to low retention heard in the Navy is an
increase in pay, and there can be no doubt that it would provide increased
retention based simply on the law of supply and demand, so long as the
elasticity of demand is not zero. It is evident from Chapter Four that
the naval officer's wages are not equivalent with those of junior execu-
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tives with Pacific Telephone. With the continuous pressure to keep the
defense budget down, there appears to be little chance of an increase in
pay which will more than retain the present relative standing. The ideal
situation would be to sit down and bargain on an individual basis with
each employee which Pacific Telephone and other industrial concerns are
able to do with their management personnel, but this obviously is not feas-
ible in the Navy. The subject of military pay is a complex one involving
many factors, the complete discussion of which is beyond the scope of
this paper. Suffice it to say that regardless of comparability with wages
in other occupations, if they are not sufficient to attract the quantity and
guality of personnel needed, then they are deficient. Responsible leaders
must continue to be vociferous in the necessity of a pay scale which will
attract sufficient personnel to the navy.
In conjunction with base pay, subsistence and quarters allowance,
the present sea pay is entirely inadequate. The naval officer must now
maintain his household at home (if married) plus the added expense of him-
self while away. In a recent study it was determined that the male head
of the household while residing at home was equal to an average 35-40
dollars extra a month. This figure included gardening duties, repairing
household items and baby-sitting. Some junior officers families must
request the assistance of Navy Relief in order to meet the household ex-
penses while the head of the household is deployed. In this day and age
of trying to make a naval career attractive, this is entirely unsatisfactory.
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To alleviate this problem area, it is recommended that a substantial in-
crease in sea pay be legislated for. This will at least make these neces-
sary long deployments at sea more bearable.
Another area that draws much criticism is the discrimination against
bachelor officers in the awarding of Basic Allowance for Quarters. Al-
though this is defined as an allowance, it still is in the true sense of
the word part of his "wages". It is recommended that the decision to
live in the BOQ's or ashore be left up to the individual officer and that
the BAQ allowance be made available to him upon request if he so desires
to live ashore. ..
Related to military pay and probably a more fruitful area for improve-
ment without large increases in the budget, is the area of fringe benefits.
The Navy does have an advantage over Pacific Telephone and other in-
dustries in this aspect and must make the optimum use of this advantage.
These benefits should be costed and given wider publicity to the young
officer about to reach a career decision point. A short, easy to read pam-
phlet could be made available to officers and their wives to show mone-
tarily what these fringe benefits consist of. The military retirement plan
should be costed from the basis of actuary tables and show a man what
his equity is at any point in time. Survivor benefits such as Dependency
and Indemnity Compensation, Death Gratuity, Medical Care and Burial
Rights should all be expressed in cost of equivalent programs so that air
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individual knows exactly what he is giving up when leaving the navy.
There are many other smaller benefits which could be included. If the
navy is to effectively compete with industry for adequate manpower, it
must take full advantage of the assets it has to offer and give them wide
publicity.
Medical care for dependents is another benefit which is implicitly
guaranteed naval personnel and a major advantage over Pacific Telephone.
Too often, however, facilities are inadequate, overcrowded, and incon-
venient, and consequently damaging to morale. Medicare was an excel-
lent program to correct many of the problems, until the coverage was
drastically reduced to a point where few even know what their benefits are
under Medicare. Reinstitution of Medicare as it previously existed would
help correct many of the deficiencies which now exist in the medical care
program.
At the present time of the major source programs, only the Naval
Academy graduates are remaining on active duty at near the desired rate.
These are young men who appear to be highly motivated toward a military
career at an early age. Perhaps there are ways of selecting career motiv-
ated young men for ijiput into the NROTC program which is the other major
source for regular officers. A series of personality test which would ident-
ify those most likely to be satisfied or dissatisfied in a military environ-
ment could be developed. This would be a very sensitive screening device,
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but is offered for an area warranting future study. Perhaps a pilot program
could be established on a limited basis, although it would take years to
analyze the results. This is an area where Pacific Telephone has a tre-
mendous advantage in that they are much more flexible in their selection
criteria.
Retention rates for officers commissioned under the various source
programs for reserve officers is very poor. In order to gain a regular com-
mission these officers must initiate applications and then be selected by
an augmentation board. A system could be implemented whereby those
officers clearly desired in the career force could be identified and offered
a regular commission approximately one year before the expiration of
obligated service. Many of those who are seriously considering a career,
but not strongly enough to initiate the paperwork, might be favorably in-
fluenced. It would certainly appeal to an officer's ego and show that
the navy is officially interested in retaining his services.
There are areas for improvement in management policies at the in-
dividual command level which could go a long way toward improving reten-
tion. Naval personnel while at sea spend long hours at work and many
days without the comforts of shore. The hard work and long hours are
expected as a necessary part of the mission of the Navy and generally
completed with pride. However, every effort should be made while in
port to afford personnel a normal forty hour work week. Leave periods
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should not be arbitrarily restricted unless it would be detrimental to
accomplishment of the mission. Every effort should be made at the com-
mand level to provide personnel ashore maximum, time with theirlamilies
when it does not generally affect fleet readiness.
There are many personnel who would make a career of the navy for smaller
tangible rewards then they are now receiving, be it for security, sense of
patriotism, adventure, or a host of other reasons. However, there are
also those who would not voluntarily remain regardless of the benefits
offered. In order to attract a desired number of those between the two
extremes, sufficient remuneration is going to have to be offered eventually
if an increased number of personnel are to be retained voluntarily. Even if
wages were equal to comparable civilian occupations, if they do not produce
the necessary quantity, then they are inadequate if we are to give any
credence to the economic law of supply and demand.
If retention is to be improved within current appropriations, the Navy
must give the maximum publicity to the advantages of the navy career and
every effort must be made at all levels of command to provide whatever
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Many studies have been conducted on the problem of retention in the
Armed Services emphasizing either the importance of more pay, better
living conditions, more benefits, better security or other topics similar
to these with the intention of making a career in the Armed Services more
attractive. What would happen if we were able to completely reorganize
the Armed Services with the express purpose of making a military career
as attractive as possible and still maintain the strength and ability to
carry out the basic mission. With this in mind, we have proposed what
we think could be an area of study for further research papers and we
have called it The Radical Approach. An outline of this approach to-
gether with a brief discussion of each proposal and costs follows:
(a) The Recommendation.
(1) Abolish the entire military pay structure as is presently exists,
(2) Abolish MEDICARE for Service members.
(3) Abolish all military commissaries.
(4) Abolish all medical facilities operated by the service in the
continential United States except for Training Commands.
(5) Abolish the leave (vacation) program used in the service.
(6) Abolish the military retirement program.
(7) Abolish present promotion criteria as practiced in the service.
A-l

(b) Substitute for the above as follows:
(1) Provide a new pay structure by matching job skill levels
with Civil Service rates as a guide modified by adding increments for:
a. Constant availability for 24-hour call.
b. Inability and impracticality for the service member to
resign or quit on short notice.
c. Subjection of the service member to noncivil disciplinary
sanctions.
d. Extended absences from family (over a minimum).
e. Hazardous and isolated duty.
f. The requirement to lay down one's life if necessary.
(2) Provide complete family medical coverage under a civilian
operated health plan such as Blue Cross.
(3) Provide a selective-competitive type of promotion process
and do away with "time in grade" and "linearity" methods.
(4) Set up a vacation plan identical to Civil Service with added
authority to accumulate unused leave days due to military exigency.
(5) Provide retirement at the same rate as Civil Service (no more
20-year retirements).
(6) As is being presently done, withhold reasonable sums when
the service member occupies government quarters.
(7) Provide a mechanism to bring people into the Service at nearly
any grade level if qualified.
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Discussion of the Advantages of the Approach.
Initially, for the first time in relatively recent history, the compar-
ability issue will no longer be cluttered by foggy ideas of service bene-
fits which totally destroy adequate costing of "tradeoffs" with alternative
considerations. Service members and their dependents could afford living
standards comparable to civilians of similar intelligence, talent, and
ability. They would buy their necessities and luxuries from the same
outlets as their civilian counterparts. This would make retailers in
service oriented communities very happy indeed. Dependents would use
civilian medical facilities just as their counterpart neighbors. When con-
sidering the question "Stay or get out/" the decision would fall only to
the question of which atmosphere would he and his family be most happy
living in. While there would be longer and more frequent separations from
family in the service, there would also be a little more money coming in
than as a civilian. Reenlistment consideration will be set on a solid base
for adequately weighing the prospects of "competing" for a career in the
Service.
Promotion would be merited on a competitive basis by and large, with
no built-in guarantees of succeeding to superior levels of responsibility.
Very likely there would be waiting lists of persons trying to get in and
selectivity would be possible up and down the line. Further, one would
never know when an open billet might be filled by direct commissioning
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or awardance of rate from civilian life. Possibly the whole trend in the
Service today would be reversed, and there would be no question of input
quality to graduate schools.
The net result would be a tendency toward higher caliber individuals
in billets all the way up the line. Morale would automatically be less
of a problem and professional competence a source of satisfaction with
promotion as its reward.
Relevant Costs .
Now for the third important question. What would be costs of this
radical change? Quite obviously the military pay bill (which would now
be combined with the annual Civil Service Bill), would be considerably
higher. Immediate and untested reaction would undoubtedly amount to a
rowsing "pshawi" However, if the problem is to be addressed at all, it
can be addressed only clinically with the very tools now being refined in
DOD. Costs would have to be assigned to all the variables. We can do
this by first asking the "right" questions, namely:
What is the present cost for military personnel?
How much does it cost to vacate an operational billet when a
man is sent to school for special training?
What is the dollar cost of the schooling itself?
What is the dollar cost (at present value) of training lost over the
years when a trained man resigns or fails to reenlist?
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What is the added dollar cost (at present value) of training ad-
ditional personnel and vacating additional billets because of resignations,
etc. ?
What is the dollar value of loss in efficiency (achieved less the
"best") in military operations due to lack of adequate training and experience?
What is the dollar cost of service incurred training given to sub-
sequent resignees which is not later put to material use in the expansion
of the GNP?
What would be the dollar saving of reduced OCS and ROTC programs?
What would be the dollar value of increased morale under the
proposed system?
Once all costs are produced in terms of present value they could be
compared on a balance sheet - the current structure against one oriented
along Civil Service lines as indicated. Then and only then can feasibility
in the "status" approach be satisfactorily determined. No amount of political
"jabber" in the Congressional Record can be substituted for this type of
analysis if adequate consideration is to be given to any material change in
the military structure. In all the research data reviewed - the reports,
bulletins, studies, proposals, long winded hearings, and political "wind, "
nothing has been produced or offered that shows promise of turning the tide
of the "retention problem" if it exists. Economic inducement alone may
never reach the heart of the problem - yet this is precisely the core con-
tent of all effort thus far.
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